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ARGUMENTS
I.

PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THE
OUTDOOR MUSIC ORDINANCE IS NOT MOOT, AND PARK CITY
FAILED TO FOLLOW THE RULES IN RAISING THIS ISSUE
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides the appropriate

procedure that a party can and should follow "[i]f a party determines that one or more
issues have been rendered moot[.]" Utah R. App. P. 37(a). Under Rule 37, the proper
procedure is to file a "suggestion of mootness" motion that complies with Rule 23 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 37(a). This rule serves the dual
purpose of allowing parties to agree in advance to the status of the case by stipulation
and to thereby reduce the need for additional filings. "Absent such agreement, [the party
seeking dismissal must file a motion and pay whatever costs and fees the court orders]."
Utah R. App. 37(b). Park City failed to follow this procedure when raising its mootness
argument; thus, the appellate court need not address its argument.
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also provides that "[t]he
original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court,... the transcript of proceedings, if
any, the index prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall
constitute the record on appeal in all cases." Utah R. App. P. 11(a). In raising its
mootness argument, Park City improperly cites facts that were not before the trial court
and documents, including an affidavit as addendum to its brief, that are outside the
record, without first filing a motion to supplement the record pursuant to Rules 11 and

1

23. See Utah R. App. P. 11 and 23. Accordingly, the City's mootness argument and the
documents relied thereupon should not be considered.
Even if the appellate court considers Park City's argument it should be rejected
because the Outdoor Music Ordinance, even in its amended form, is unconstitutional for
the same or analogous reasons as cited in Plaintiffs' brief. See Appellants' Brief at 4655. As in the proceedings before the trial court, Defendants are now trying to rely on the
ordinances to shield their nuisance conduct, which they cannot do. Plaintiffs are entitled
to a review of their claim concerning the validity and constitutionality of the Outdoor
Music Ordinance.
II.

PLAINTIFFS' NUISANCE CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED AND WERE
UNCHALLENGED IN THE DISTRICT COURT, THUS CREATING NO
BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THOSE CLAIMS
A. The permits and ordinances do not bar plaintiffs' nuisance claims
As a matter of well-settled law, neither the permits issued in 1999 nor the Outdoor

Music Ordinances passed thereafter bar Plaintiffs' nuisance claims. See Appellants'
Brief at 37-40 (citing various cases and secondary sources supporting same). Plaintiffs'
claims survive irrespective of the authorization for the outdoor concerts and irrespective
of whether or not a violation occurred under the applicable authorization. See id.1

1

Both the City and Barton have admitted that the 1999 permits were violated and
that the City revoked those permits as a result thereof. (See R. at 149-50,ffi[7-8; 1026).
As explained elsewhere, these admissions refute Defendants' own motions for summary
judgment. See infra Section 11(C).
2

B. Defendants did not challenge Plaintiffs' nuisance claims below
The City and the Arts Council argue for the first time on appeal that summary
judgment was appropriate because Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the elements of a statutory
and common law nuisance.2 The City did not challenge Plaintiffs' nuisance claims in the
district court, relying instead on the flawed argument that the permits and Outdoor Music
Ordinance bar those claims. (See R. at 159). The Arts Council, on the other hand, raised
no argument whatsoever regarding this issue. (See R. at 611-13).3 A party is generally
barred from raising an issue for the first time on appeal. See State v. Bluff 2002 UT 66,
K 25, 52 P.3d 1210. Additionally, as explained below, even if this "alternative theory"
argument is considered by the appellate court, the record does not support it.4 Thus, the
appellate court may not affirm on this ground. See State v. Henderson, 2007 UT App.
125, Tf 15, 159 P.3d 397 ("[the appellate court] may affirm a trial court's judgment on an
alternative ground, but only if the alternative ground is apparent on the record and
sustainable by the factual findings of the trial court") (emphasis added) (internal
quotations & citation omitted))).
2

See City's Brief at 21 (incorporating by reference Section I of Barton et al.'s
brief). See also Barton et a/.'s Brief at 6-15.
3

The Arts Council filed no memorandum in support of its motion for summary
judgment. The Arts Council solely relied instead on the affidavits of Dwayne A. Vance,
Randy Barton, and Joanna Charnes. (See R. 614-17; 618-23; 624-29). These affidavits
do not refute the allegations of nuisance contained in Plaintiffs' pleadings and affidavits.
4

Indeed there is no finding in the trial court's ruling to support this notion (i.e.,
that no nuisance existed) either. (See Ruling and Order at 753-58).
3

C. Defendants' "alternative theory" is not supported by the record
As an initial matter of clarification, Defendants' reliance on Gerbich v. NumecL
Inc., 1999 UT 37, 977 P.2d 1205, is misplaced inasmuch as they have failed to properly
challenge the allegations of the complaint. Gerbich explains that the opposing party's
obligation arises "[o]nce the allegations in the complaint are challenged" in accordance
with Rule 56. 1999 UT 37, ^ 12.5 Defendants overlook this fact and, more important,
they overlook the fact that the record is replete with unchallenged affidavits, admissions
of Defendants, and pleadings all supporting Plaintiffs' nuisance claims and creating
material issues of fact. (See Aff. of Whaley at 84-102; Aff. of Reif at 64-82; Aff. of Sola
at 104-11; Aff. of Cline at 1164-66; Amended Complaint at 667, U 55; 682-87; R. at 14950, Hf 7-8; 1026).
A judgment cannot be granted unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). The trial court's
Ruling and Order is devoid of findings that would sustain a judgment. (See Ruling and
Order at 753-57). Accordingly, Defendants' "alternative theory" should be rejected. See

5

Gerbich also states that the opposing party's obligation is particularly important
after discovery has been conducted. See 1999 UT 37, f 12. As noted in Appeallants'
Brief, summary judgment should not been granted until Plaintiffs had an opportunity to
conduct discovery. See Appellants' Brief at 60-62.
4

Henderson. 2007 UT App. 125, K 15.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is no basis for Defendants' assertion that
Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of their nuisance claims.
1. The record supports Plaintiffs' common law nuisance claim
Under Utah law, a person claiming a common law claim of nuisance need only
show two elements: "(1) existence of injury to the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his
property and (2) an injury that is both substantial and unreasonable." Walker Drug Co..
Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co.. 972 P.2d 1238, 1245 (Utah 1998) (internal quotations & citation
omitted). Both of these elements are supported by the record. In particular, Plaintiffs'
pleadings and affidavits support these elements, as do the admissions of Defendants.
a. Plaintiffs have sustained injury to their use and enjoyment of property
"The music . . . was so loud that [Plaintiffs] were unable to enjoy any activities
inside or outside of [their] home." (Aff. of Whaley at 89, ^f 28; see also Aff. of Reif at
67, | 27; 76, Tf 80). "Basic life activities, such as sleeping, resting, relaxing, working,
studying, reading, or doing anything that required concentration, were impossible due to
the loud noise created by the outdoor music concerts." (Aff. of Whaley at 89,129; see
also Aff. of Reif at 67, f 28). Even simple pleasures, such as taking a bath, were
impossible when the music was playing. (See Aff. of Whaley at 98,
1f 89; see also Aff. of Reif at 77, % 90).
"[Plaintiffs] could not enjoy meals or conversations together as a result of the

5

loud, intrusive noise." (Aff. of Reif at 75, ^f 79). Plaintiffs were unable to hear their
television over the noise. (See Aff. of Whaley at 91, ^} 39; see also Aff. of Reif at 69,
Tf 39; 75, Tf 78). Ms. Reif, an accomplished flutist, was prevented from practicing her
instrument during the concerts. (See Aff. of Whaley at 97, ^ 82; see also Aff. of Reif at
65, If 3; 76, ^f 83). Plaintiffs were also prevented from enjoying their own music
selections during the loud concerts. (See Aff. of Whaley at 97, ^[ 83; see also Aff. of Reif
at 76, f 84).
These interferences continued throughout the entire length of the performances
and included disturbances caused by the crowds attending the concerts. (See Aff. of
Whaley at 97-98,ffi[84-86; see also Aff. of Reif at 76,ffif85-87). The injuries described
herein have not been resolved and have continued to the present day. (See Amended
Complaint at 684,ffif185-86).
b. Plaintiffs' injury is both substantial and unreasonable
"Intrusions from the loud music occurred every day as well as every night [with
limited exception]." (Aff. of Whaley at 89, If 30; see also Aff. of Reif at 67, Tf 29).
Plaintiffs complained incessantly to the City about these intrusions. (See Aff. of Whaley
at 90, If 35; 91, f 43; see also Aff. of Reif at 69, f 43; 77, f 90). Plaintiffs complained
about the noise volume, the number of hours of intrusion, and that performances were
occurring before or after they were allowed. (See Aff. of Whaley at 91, ^ 43, 45-46).
"[Plaintiffs'] voices became so familiar to police dispatchers that [the dispatchers] began

6

calling [Plaintiffs] by [their] first names before [Plaintiffs] identified themselves." (Aff.
of Whaley at 9 2 , t 4 9 ; see also Aff. of Reif at 70, f 49). When Plaintiffs' complaints
went unresolved, Plaintiffs phoned the police department again and again noting the
severity of the interference and emphasizing that it was preventing them from working
and enjoying the most basic of functions at their home. (See Aff. of Reif at 77, ^ 90).
On at least one occasion, the police responded to Plaintiffs' home and agreed with
Plaintiffs that the music was too loud, but they said they could do nothing about it. (See
Aff. of Whaley at 92, ^ 48; see also Aff. of Reif at 70, f 48). The City's Police Chief has
spoken out against outdoor music, stating that " . . . the number of hours requested [by the
permittees] is extreme and not in the best interest of the business and residential
neighbors of these establishments." (Amended Complaint at 667, f 55). Another City
Official told Plaintiffs that members of the City Council had also spoken out against the
noise level, reporting that one Councilmember had gone on record, saying "This Noise Is
Damn Outrageous!" (See Aff. of Whaley at 92-93, f 51: see also Aff. of Reif at 70-71,
Tl 51). The City also acknowledged during summary judgment proceedings that noise
violations occurred and that the City revoked the permits as result of those violations.
(See R. at 149-50,ffi[7-8). Despite these statements against interests by the City and
Plaintiffs' continuous complaints, the City continued to do nothing (and, in fact,
continued to allow the complained of activity year after year), and, thus, no relief resulted
for Plaintiffs. (See Aff. of Whaley at 92-93,ffi[51-52; see also Aff. of Reif at 70-71, ffil

7

51-52). This was and continues to be absolutely irresponsible on the City's part and has
directly contributed to Plaintiffs' ongoing substantial and unreasonable injury described
here.
Plaintiffs complained directly to Barton at the venues. (See Aff. of Whaley at 99,
f 93; see also Aff. of Reif at 78, f 95; 80-81,1104). However, instead of simply
adjusting the volume control lever that he operated to a reasonable level (see Aff. of
Whaley at 99, Tf 93; see also Aff. of Reif at 78, ^ 95), which is all Plaintiffs sought,
Barton refused and asserted that the City would defend him if Plaintiffs took legal
action.6 (See Aff. of Reif at 80, f 101). Because of Barton's refusal to comply with
Plaintiffs' simple request, Plaintiffs have suffered the substantial and unreasonable injury
explained here.7
6

Barton's defiance has continued throughout this litigation. Indeed when the
appellate court ordered mediation, neither he nor his counsel participated. Given
Barton's lack of participation, mediation could not (and, in fact, did not) succeed; thus,
Plaintiffs have had to continue their litigation course when Barton could have avoided
this altogether by simply acting civilly in the first place, and when given the opportunity
to atone for his conduct after-the-fact, he simply failed to cooperate or make any
conciliatory gesture whatsoever.
7

Contrary to Barton's assertion (see Barton et al.'s Brief at 8-9, 14), his defiance
and continued conduct DOES constitute an intent to create the nuisance complained of
by Plaintiffs. See Bowen v. Town of Greenwich et aL. 2007 WL 3121764 *3 (Conn.
Super 2007) (unpublished decision) ("A defendant 'intentionally' creates a nuisance
when it intentionally creates a condition found to constitute a nuisance, whether or not it
intended or understood that by creating that condition it was doing wrong or creating a
nuisance. . . .Thus, to establish that a defendant intentionally created a . . . nuisance, the
plaintiff need only establish that it was the defendant's conscious objective to create the
condition later claimed to constitute a . . . nuisance essentially as it was when it caused
the plaintiff injury.") As Barton points out: "the outdoor music performance was
8

Due to Defendants' refusal to address the noise issue, Plaintiffs attempted
numerous self-help measures, but nothing made any difference until they left their home.
(See Aff. of Whaley at 98, f 87; see also Aff. of Reif at 76-77, ^ 88). Plaintiffs tried
closing their windows and doors, but that made no difference. (See Aff. of Whaley at 97,
f 80; see also Aff. of Reif at 76, K 81). They tried using earplugs, but that too did not
work. (See Aff. of Whaley at 90, % 36; see also Aff. of Reif at 68, f 35). "[Plaintiffs]
were able to seek relief only by leaving [their] home and then returning after the music
ceased. This form of self-help was enormously inconvenient and stressful for both
[Plaintiffs]." (Aff. of Whaley at 98, U 88; see also Aff. of Reif at 76-77, U 89).
Contrary to Defendants' argument, there is simply no social utility in making
Plaintiffs' home life impossible and forcing them to leave numerous time a week, year
after year because the City or other members of the public think it's acceptable to allow
amplified music at an unreasonable volume level at a neighboring property. The fact of
the matter is that the outdoor music can be conducted at a volume level that does not
unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment; thus, to insist that it be
conducted in a way that repeatedly forces them from their own home is simply
unreasonable and unjustifiable. This is exactly the kind of situation in which the ancient
maxim sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedas was intended to prevent.

intended to occur" (Barton et al.'s Brief at 8-9); thus, he is responsible for the resulting
nuisance.
9

Twenty-Second Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Oregon Short Line R. Co.. 103 P. 243 (Utah 1909), does not govern this case, and it is
quite interesting that Defendants would even cite it as it relies on a general principle of
nuisance requiring community-wide impact of the nuisance complained of (e.g., train
whistles and bells) which is precisely the point they argue against elsewhere in their
brief. See Barton et al.'s Brief at 7 (arguing that outdoor music adversely impacted two
people).
Plaintiffs' noise expert, Mr. Sola, analyzed the Outdoor Music Ordinance and
testified that it was flawed or otherwise deficient in many respects. (See Aff. of Sola at
107-09,ffi[15-19). Mr. Sola testified that the 90 decibels permitted by the Ordinance
would and, in fact, has resulted in "excessive and unusually loud" noise and would
"deprive nearby residents of the reasonable and comfortable enjoyment of their homes."
(Aff. of Sola at 109,ffi[20, 21 (emphasis added)). He also testified that the band shells
that were studied and implemented by the City would "actually funnel" the noise to
certain residents, just as Plaintiff complained occurred to them. (Aff. of Sola at 109,
If 19). Mr. Sola further stated:
[t]he level of amplified music [allowed under the Ordinance]
would likely interfere with 'the comfort, repose, peace,
health, and enjoyment' of persons residing . . . nearby . . . .
such as Mr. Whaley and Ms. Reif. The amplified music will
emanate beyond the boundaries of the immediate business
establishments from which the music originates to nearby
residents, including Mr. Whaley and Ms. Reif, and the level
of noise reaching such individuals will likely interfere with
10

residents' ability to sleep, study, read, converse, concentrate
or otherwise carry on normal activities around one's property.
[I]t is neither surprising nor unreasonable that Mr. Whaley
and Ms. Reif have complained numerous times of
experiencing excessive noise on their property and inside
their home.
(Aff. of Sola at 109-10,fflf22-24) (emphasis added).
The foregoing - all of which is uncontested - show that Plaintiffs have suffered
injury that is both unreasonable and substantial. Thus, no summary judgment in
Defendants' favor could have or should have been granted.
2. The record supports Plaintiffs' § 78-38-1 private nuisance claim
Section 78-38-1 creates a private cause of action for nuisance for "anything which
is injurious to health, indecent, offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use
of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property." Utah
Code § 78-38-1(1) (2002). As explained above, the level of noise created by
Defendants' outdoor music has been offensive to the senses, and has obstructed
Plaintiffs' free use of property, so as to interfere with their comfortable enjoyment of life
or property. See supra at Section II(C)(l)(a)-(b). Accordingly, the record does not
support a judgment in favor of Defendants.8

8

Contrary to Defendants' assertion (see Barton et a/.'s Brief at 10), this statute
does not require that a certain number of individuals complain.
Defendants' depiction of the applicable zoning is incorrect. (See Barton et al. 's
Brief at 10). Plaintiffs' home is zoned residential. (See Aff. of Whaley at 87,fflf8-9).
Regardless, merely because an area may be zoned commercial does not justify the
11

3, The record supports Plaintiffs' § 76-10-803 public nuisance claim
Section 76-10-803 recognizes a claim for public nuisance under several
circumstances, including when an act or omission: "(a) annoys, injures, or endangers the
comfort, repose, health, or safety of three or more persons;... [or] (e) in any way renders
three or more persons insecure in life or the use of property. (2) An act which affects
three or more persons in any of the ways specified in this section is still a nuisance
regardless of the extent to which the annoyance or damage inflicted on individuals is
unequal." Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-803(l)(a), (e), (2) (2003).
a. Three or more persons were affected
Barton incorrectly asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to establish the "three or more
persons" standard. See Barton et al.'s Brief at 7. Others were impacted and did, in fact,
complain. (See Amended Complaint at 683, ^[ 184). Indeed, Barton admitted as much:
"Last week that permit was rescinded due to complaints received from residents (one

creation or maintenance of a nuisance. See generally Davis v. J.C. Nichols Co.. 714
S.W.2d 679, 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (stating same).
If no evidence exists in the record of an actual decibel reading, as Defendants
argue (see Barton et a/.'s Brief at 11), it is because the City never actually purchased such
a device for its own use or otherwise took such a reading. (See Amended Complaint at
667, Tf 54). Instead, the City phoned Barton on numerous occasions to ask him (or his
associate) to "check" the noise level. (See R. at 341; 343; 348; 351). Amazingly, Barton
was able to tell that the noise level was within proper limits even though he was not at the
subject venue when the complaints were made. (See R. at 341; 351). Relying on Barton
to police his own conduct is akin to letting the fox rule the henhouse and magnifies the
special legislation at issue here. See Appellants' Brief at 53.
12

individual in particular living near the plazaf)]." (R. at 1026 (emphasis added)). At
most, Barton's admission can be interpreted to include only one of Plaintiffs, as they both
lived near the plazas at the time. Others clearly complained, according to Barton; thus,
an issue of fact precludes summary judgment.
An essential fact is also missing from the City's brief regarding this issue and, in
particular, with respect to why the stage at the Marriott Plaza did not operate this past
summer. The reason why programming for this stage was canceled was because a
business owner adjacent to that stage complained. It is also important to note that the
Marriott Summit Watch owners' association, asserted in the City's brief as the reason for
the discontinuance of performances at the Summit Watch Plaza, relates to a
timeshare/vacation project in the plaza area and has likely generated complaints from
members and/or guests, which the City is not disclosing. Furthermore, even a City
Councilmember has complained, calling the noise volume "Damn Outrageous!" See
supra at 7. The City has also admitted that others have complained. See kL
Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate and, at the very least, Plaintiffs should
be allowed to conduct discovery regarding this issue.
b. Plaintiffs suffered special injury
As argued above, Plaintiffs have suffered special injury. See supra at Section
II(C)(l)(a)-(b).
c. Defendants' conduct constitutes a nuisance per se and was unreasonable

13

Barton's violation of the 1999 permits constitutes a nuisance per se. This is
supported by the fact that the permits themselves contained conditions, which stated:
"Sound levels on all amplified sound will remain at a reasonable level [so] as not to
unduly disturb the surrounding neighborhood. . . .The applicants will confine the event
activity to those areas indicated in the sire [sic] plan submitted. .. .The applicants will
confine the hours of th[e] event[s] to a time frame indicated on the application. Failure
to do so may cause this approval to be withdrawn for the remaining events." (R. at 278;
279). When Barton failed to comply with these conditions, Plaintiffs and others
complained, resulting in the City revoking the permits. (See R. at 1026). By revoking
the permits, the City found Barton in violation thereof; thus, a nuisance per se existed. A
nuisance per se also existed because Barton's conduct was not in conformance with the
City's general noise ordinance. See Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267,
276 (Utah 1982) ("When the conditions giving rise to a nuisance are also a violation of a
statutory prohibition, those conditions constitute a nuisance per se . . . .").9
As explained above Defendants' conduct was unreasonable. See supra at Section
I(C)(l)(a)-(b). Defendants' conduct was also intentional, negligent, reckless, or
ultrahazardous, inasmuch as Defendants intended and, in fact, caused the concerts to
occur. See supra at 8 n.7. Accordingly, Defendants are responsible, and a judgment in

9

An issue of fact also exists with respect to the concerts performed under the
Outdoor Music Ordinance and whether they were held within the proscribed limits; thus,
summary judgment is inappropriate on this ground as well.
14

their favor is unwarranted.
III.

U.C.A. § 10-8-60 DOES NOT INSULATE PARK CITY FROM LIABILITY
UNDER STATE NUISANCE LAWS
Park City's power to regulate and abate nuisances under 10-8-60 of the Utah Code

pertains to public, as opposed to private, nuisances. See generally 6A McQuillin on
Municipal Corporations § 24.64, at 245 (3d ed. 1997). Thus, the Outdoor Music
Ordinance has no bearing on or other relationship to Plaintiffs' statutory and common
law private nuisance claims.
The Outdoor Music Ordinance also has no bearing on. Plaintiffs' statutory public
nuisance claims because whether or not a particular activity asserted to be a nuisance
(whether public or private) is permitted (or proscribed) by ordinance does not entitle the
activity to continue. See id § 24.60, at 232. See also City of Farmington v. Wilkins. 740
P.2d 1172, 1174 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). "A municipal corporation no more than any
individual or private corporation can maintain or cause a nuisance, and the same
remedies exist.. . against a nuisance arising from municipal action as in other cases."
6A McQuillin on Municipal Corporations § 24.64, at 245 (3d ed. 1997) (emphasis
added).
"A municipal corporation cannot legalize as not a nuisance that which is a
nuisance per se or at common law, per accidens or in fact, or under state statute." Id.
§ 24.69, at 265 (emphasis added). But that is precisely what the City has attempted to do
here ~ by passing the Outdoor Music Ordinance and declaring that the activity permitted
15

thereunder "is not a nuisance," the City legislated a nuisance in excess of its grant of
authority under 10-8-60 and in violation of state statutes and common law that protect
Plaintiffs' right to be free of public and private nuisances. The City is, therefore, liable
for its actions.
Park City's attempt to distinguish Weber v. Springville Citv. 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah
1986) — a case which is cited in Appellants' Brief along with other supporting citations
which the City does not challenge — is also untenable. In Weber, the Utah Supreme
Court held that a city ordinance, enacted under 10-8-60, cannot prevent civil nuisance
actions. 725 P.2d at 1367. In doing so, the Court stated: "[although Springville City
has broad powers to enact necessary measures to promote the general health, safety,
morals and welfare of its citizens,... it may not dictate the outcome of the balancing
approach utilized when applying the attractive nuisance doctrine in civil cases. Since this
Court has left this process to the trial courts and juries of this state, Springville's
ordinance facially appears to be inconsistent with state law." Id. at n.20 (emphasis
added). The same is true here: Plaintiffs' nuisance claims are questions for the Judiciary,
and their claims cannot be curtailed by the City's Ordinance that purports that outdoor
music "is not a nuisance." The fact that Weber dealt with an attractive nuisance, as
opposed to some other kind of nuisance, makes no difference here.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT THE OUTDOOR MUSIC
ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE AND AS
APPLIED

16

Park City overlooks the fact in its brief that there are actually two constitutional
challenges at issue here — facial as well as-applied. As recognized in State v. Herrera,
1999 UT 64,14 n.2, 993 P.2d 854, "[a] statute may be unconstitutional either on its face
or as applied to the facts of a given case." The Outdoor Music Ordinance is void and
unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to Plaintiffs because it: (A) violates the
Supremacy Clause and constitutes a per se taking in violation of the Takings Clause;10
(B) violates the Separation of Powers provision;11 (C) violates the Due Process Clauses;12
(D) constitutes special legislation;13 (E) delegates a core municipal;14 and (F) is repugnant
to law.15 See Appellants' Brief at 46-55. In addition, the Outdoor Music Ordinance is

10

Contrary to the City's assertion, this claim was raised and, thus, preserved
below. (R. at 810-12).
11

The City failed to directly address this challenge. See City's Brief at 33-35.

12

The City failed to directly address this issue, instead arguing generally and
without citation to the record as to where or when it gave Plaintiffs notice of the City's
intent to restrict Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights to sue. See id at 35-37.
13

The City's attempt to equate its delegation of police power to requiring a
lifeguard at a public pool is untenable. First, the rule cited by the City does not exist.
See http://www.rules.utah.gov/. Second, even assuming the rule exists, the music venues
are not public property; rather, they are privately owned and operated. Third, those
conducting the concerts are not public entities, such as a city pool; rather, they are private
individual or entities. Thus, there's no correlation between public pools and private
concert venues.
14

See id. The City's actions (or lack thereof) here speak for themselves. See
supra at 11 (noting how the City failed to respond and called Barton to determine
whether a violation had occurred).
15

The City's cursory response to this issue is inadequate. See City's Brief at 39.
17

void and unconstitutional on its face and/or as applied because it infringes upon
Plaintiffs' fundamental rights to use and enjoy their property, and fails to satisfy minimal
scrutiny and is overinclusive.16 See id. at 55.
These arguments "establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
[ordinance] would be valid" and they also "show[] that the [ordinance] was applied to
[Plaintiffs] in an unconstitutional manner." Heirera, 1999 UT 64, f 4 n.2 (citations
omitted). Therefore, Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing that the Outdoor
Music Ordinance is both facially and as-applied unconstitutional.
V.

PLAINTIFFS' TAKINGS CLAIM IS RIPE FOR REVIEW AND SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN DISPOSED OF ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

Park City's reliance on its Land Management Code is misplaced, and
the City failed to raise P.C.L.M.C. § 15-1-19 below

Park City incorrectly asserts that two provisions contained in the City's Land
Management Code govern Plaintiffs' takings claim and require Plaintiffs to exhaust
administrative remedies before proceeding with their claim. See City's Brief at 41-42.17
In particular, the City relies on§§ 15-1-18 and 15-1-19. See id. Neither of these
provisions apply here, however. Further, the City failed to raise 15-1-19 below (see R. at

16

The City failed to address this issue altogether. See id. at 30-39.

17

These provisions are not cited or otherwise provided in their entirety in the
record, and Plaintiffs question whether the language relied upon in the City's brief exists
at all or otherwise reflects the statutory language for the relevant time frame involved.
18

178); thus, there is no basis for review of that section on appeal.18 But even if 15-1-19
had been raised below, it, like 15-1-18, has no bearing on this case.
In arguing its position, the City has taken both 15-1-18 and 15-1-19 out of their
intended contexts. To begin with, it is important to note that both of these provisions are
contained in Park City's Land Management Code. See P.C.L.M.C. §§ 15-1-18 to -19.
Section 15-1-18 addresses procedures for an appeal of land use decisions made by the
Planning Director;19 whereas 15-1-19 addresses procedures for appeals of an exaction or
seizure of property by the City.20 The City's issuing of the permits and passing of

18

Similarly, the City failed to raise U.C.A. § 10-9a-801 below (see R. at 178);
thus, there is no basis for review of that section either. Notwithstanding that, section 109a-801 does not apply to this case because no land use application was made or decided
upon here; nor was any notice to the contrary ever provided to Plaintiffs. See also Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9a-707(4) ("Only those decisions in which a land use authority has
applied a land use ordinance to a particular application, person, or parcel may be
appealed to an appeal authority." (Emphasis added)). Further, as explained below,
Plaintiffs per se takings claim does not require an exhaustion of administrative remedies.
19

See P.C.L.M.C. § 15-1-18(A) ("Any decision by the Planning Director
regarding Application of this LMC to a Property may be appealed to the Planning
Commission. Decisions regarding compliance with the Historic District Guidelines may
be appealed to the Historic Preservation Board. The Appeal must be filed with the
Planning Department. There shall be no additional notice for Appeal of the staff
determination other than listing the matter on the agenda, unless notice of the staff
review was provided in which case the same notice must be given for the Appeal."
(Emphasis added)).
20

This provision also places strict requirements on the City Attorney which were
not followed here.
19

Outdoor Music Ordinances were not made by the Planning Director;21 nor were the
permits and ordinances purposed or otherwise noticed up as an exaction or seizure of
Plaintiffs' property. Therefore, the City's reliance on 15-1-18 and 15-1-19 is misplaced.
The City also overlooks the importance of the fact that Plaintiffs' notice of claim
specifically mentioned their takings claim. If the City had any intention of addressing
that claim, it could have and indeed should have done so immediately rather than
ignoring Plaintiffs' claim and allowing years of interference and damages to accrue. The
fact that the City failed to respond to Plaintiffs' notice of claim and numerous complaints
raised all along this dispute indicates that the City's policy on allowing the loud concerts
to unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' bundle of rights was settled, and any further
appeal would have been futile or inadequate.

21

Section 15-1-18(C), upon which the City relies, provides:
Final Actions by the Planning Commission on staff Appeals
[set forth in subsection (A) above] may be appealed to the
Board of Adjustment. Final Action by the Planning
Commission on Conditional Use Permits and MPDs may be
appealed to the City Council. Only those decisions in which
the Planning Commission has applied a land use ordinance to
a particular Application, Person, or Parcel may be appealed to
an appeal authority.

P.C.L.M.C. § 15-1-18(C) (emphasis added). A "Final Action" occurs when "findings of
fact and conclusions of law" have been adopted. P.C.L.M.C. § 15-1-18(N). No Final
Action has been entered. The Planning Commission has not applied a land use ordinance
to a particular Application, Person, or Parcel. See City's Brief at 40 (acknowledging
same). Nor was notice of such action ever provided to Plaintiffs as required by law.
Thus, 15-1-18 is entirely inapplicable here.
20

B.

A taking has occurred; thus, summary judgment in the City's favor
was error

As explained above, the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Park
City on the sole basis that § 15-1-18 of the Park City Land Management Code (see
Ruling and Order at 757) required Plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies
before pursuing their takings claim was flawed and should be reversed. Notwithstanding
that error, Plaintiffs' takings claim should be allowed to proceed because a per se taking
has occurred here for which no exhaustion of administrative remedies is required.22
A per se taking has occurred because, as the City has asserted throughout this
case, the Outdoor Music Ordinance forecloses Plaintiffs' right to sue under state and
federal law. See Appellants' Brief at 48, 56. Additionally, a per se taking by physical
invasion has occurred by the activities allowed by the permits and ordinances,23 which
has resulted in an inverse condemnation of Plaintiffs' property. See Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3175 (1982)
22

Nor can any such requirement be constitutionally imposed. Thus, any provision
relied on to the contrary (e.g., § 15-1-18 (or even § 15-1-19) of the P.C.L.M.C.) is
unconstitutional.
23

The City's assertion that Plaintiffs' takings claim is defeated on the basis of
Plaintiffs' claim that the permits and ordinances are invalid (see City's Brief at 40) is not
supported by law. See, e.g.. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 428 U.S. 304, 319, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2388, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250, 266-67 (1987)
(holding that landowner was entitled to compensation for taking for interim period of
years before invalidation of county ordinance). Under First English, Plaintiffs are
entitled to compensation from the time the permits and ordinances were issued or enacted
to the time of their invalidation. See id.

21

("reemphasiz[ing] that a physical invasion is a government intrusion of an usually serious
character"). See also McCarren Int'l. Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1125 (Nev.
2006) (holding that physical invasion need not be constant where complained of activity
is preserved by ordinance and expected to continue in the future), and Columbia County
v. Doolittle. 512 S.E.2d 236, 237-38 (Ga. 1999) ("To state a claim for inverse
condemnation, the property owner does not have to show a physical invasion that
damages the property, but only an unlawful interference with the owner's right to enjoy
the land." (Citations omitted)).
As recognized in Bormann v. Board of Supervisors In and For Kossuth County:
Whether you flood the farmer's fields so that they cannot be
cultivated, or pollute the bleacher's stream so that his fabrics
are stained, or fill one's dwelling with . . . noise so that it
cannot be occupied in comfort, you equally take away the
owner's property. In neither instance has the owner any less
of material things than he had before, but in each case the
utility of his property has been impaired by a direct invasion
of the bounds of his private dominion. This is the taking of
his property in a constitutional sense.
584 N.W.2d 309, 320 (Iowa 1998) (emphasis added & citation omitted), cert, denied,
524 U.S. 1172,119 S. Ct. 1096, 143 L.Ed.2d 96. That is precisely what the City has
done here (see supra at Section 11(C))24; thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to just compensation
plus prejudgment interest thereon from the date the permits and ordinances were enacted

24

Indeed Plaintiffs' ability to possess, use and enjoy, and exclude have all been
taken by the City's actions.
22

to the date of entry judgment. See McCarren Int'l. Airport. 137 P.3d at 1127.
A taking has also occurred due to the (1) economic impact that the regulations at
issue have had on Plaintiffs (see Aff. of Whaley at 100, ^ 100 (significant diminishment
in property value); 89, Tf 29; 97, ^[81 (inability to work): see also Aff. of Reif at 65, U 7;
67, TI28; 76, ^f 82 (same)), and such regulations have unfairly singled out Plaintiffs by
placing two venues within close proximity of their home and requiring them to bear the
burdens resulting therefrom that the public as a whole could have (and indeed should
have) been required to bear, (2) interference with Plaintiffs' investment-backed
expectations (see id.), and (3) character of the government action, which is overinclusive
and cannot be supported even under a rational basis test. See Appellants' Brief at 55.
When a per se taking has occurred, as explained here, no exhaustion of
administrative remedies is required. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 505
U.S. 1003, 1012, 112 S.Ct. 2886,2891, 120 L.Ed.2d798 (1992). See also McCarren
Int'l. Airport, 137 P.3d at 1123 (stating that "[property owner] was not required to
exhaust administrative remedies .. . before bringing his inverse condemnation action
based on a regulatory per se taking of his private property").25
VI.

THE AUGUST 7, 2002 RULING AND ORDER WAS NOT FINAL
The City's assertion that the August 7, 2002 Ruling and Order was final (see

25

Further, the City lacks standing to raise due process claims on behalf of third
parties; thus, such argument should be disregarded.
23

City's Brief at 45-46) ignores altogether the rule for determining whether an order is, in
fact, final. (See Appellants' Brief at 58). The City also ignores the fact that the Utah
Court of Appeals has already effectively determined that the August 7, 2002 Order was
not final, and that is why the case was remanded back to the trial court before Plaintiffs
could proceed with their appeal. (See Memorandum Decision at 1306-07). The trial
court's rulings thereafter also make clear that the court "never clearly dismissed" one of
Plaintiffs' claims (Minutes at 1329; Minute Entry at 1400); thus, the trial court itself
acknowledged the very argument the City now argues against. The City's argument is
baseless. The August 7, 2002 Ruling and Order was not final. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
should have been granted reconsideration (see Appellants' Brief at 58-59).
Similarly, Plaintiffs should have been granted reconsideration on their
constitutional claims against the Outdoor Music Ordinance under the factors set forth in
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). (See
Appellants' Brief at 59-60; see also R. at 805-33; 882-90). Further, to suggest as
Defendants do that no harm would result if summary judgment is reversed on appeal
simply ignores the purpose of a motion for reconsideration - which, as recognized in
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1185 (Utah 1983), is to ensure that cases are justly
and expeditiously resolved in the trial court. Plaintiffs have literally endured years of
ongoing harm, time lost and money spent in defending this lawsuit, which cannot be
recouped by a reversal, and Defendants' suggestion to the contrary is disingenuous.

24

VII.

ATTORNEY CLINE'S AFFIDAVIT SATISFIES RULE 56(f)
Rule 56(f) states: "When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the

affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present
by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained
or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is
just." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). Mr. Cline's affidavit explains that he has found a witness
who directly contradicts Barton's testimony concerning his involvement with the 1999
(and 2000) concerts, and he asks permission to move forward with an Attorney Planning
Conference Report so that discovery can commence which would allow him to depose
that person. (See Aff. of Cline at 1164-66). Mr. Cline further supplements his affidavit
with various newspaper notices that advertise concerts offered by Barton and his
business, The Wooden Dog, which are precisely the concerts Barton alleged earlier in his
affidavit he had nothing to do with and which was clearly not the case based on the
information contained in public documents which could also be construed as Barton's
business records and further admissions. (See Aff. of Cline at 166,1f 15). Because an
Attorney Planning Conference had been foreclosed by the court's previous rulings,
Attorney Cline was acting correctly and in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
To suggest as Barton does that Attorney Cline should have acted sooner, simply ignores
the status of the case, its unusual course, and the Rules. Similarly, Barton's suggestion

25

that Plaintiffs had an adequate opportunity to respond to his supplemental affidavit,
which was delivered one day before the summary judgment hearing, is absurd.
VIIL BARTON FAILED TO CONTEST THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND, THEREFORE, HE HAS WAIVED
ANY OBJECTION THERETO ON APPEAL
Barton attempts to argue for the first time on appeal that Plaintiffs' statements and
references to the uncontested record should not be considered on appeal because those
statements are inadmissible or otherwise lack support. (See Barton et a/.'s Brief at 25).
Barton does not get to pick and choose which portions of the record Plaintiffs cite. He
failed to raise any objection whatsoever to the portions of the relied upon when the case
was pending in the district court; thus, he cannot now challenge those portions of the
record merely because doing so is convenient to him as he tries to overcome the fact that
the record does not support his fictitious theory that he had essentially nothing to do with
the 1999 concerts.
IX.

COSTS ON APPEAL ARE NOT DEPENDANT UPON PLAINTIFFS'
SUCCESS BELOW AS BARTON ERRONEOUSLY SUGGESTS
Barton erroneously argues that costs on appeal are dependant upon Plaintiffs'

success below. (See Barton et a/.'s Brief at 25). The award of costs on appeal is not
dependant upon whether a party succeeds or fails below. See Utah R. App. P. 34.
Accordingly, Barton's argument should be disregarded.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and in Appellants' Brief, the relief requested in
26

Appellants' Brief should be granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this K day of January, 2008.
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C.

By Jf//~Russell A. Cline
Attorney for Appellants
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)539-1900
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ADDENDUM
(Bowen v. Town of Greenwich et al.. 2007 WL 3121764 (Conn. Super 2007)
(unpublished decision))
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Westlaw
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Not Reported in A.2d
Not Reported in A.2d, 2007 WL 3121764 (Conn.Super.)
(Cite as: Not Reported in A.2d)

Bowen v. Town of Greenwich
Conn.Super.,2007.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.
Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of
Stamford-Norwalk.
Elizabeth BOWEN
v.
TOWN OF GREENWICH et al.
No.CV065001197S.
Oct. 15,2007.
Tooher & Wocl LLC, Stamford, for Elizabeth
Bowen.
Greenwich Town Attorney, Greenwich, for Town of
Greenwich.
Lynch Traub Keefe & Errante PC, New Haven, for
Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation.RICHARD A.
ROBINSON, J.

created an absolute nuisance in that the conditions
alleged by the plaintiff had "a natural tendency to
create danger and inflict injury upon persons such
as the plaintiff."She alleges that the danger created
by the subject defendant was a continuing one and
that the defendant's use of the land was
unreasonable. She alleges that the condition or
conduct interfered with a right common to the
general public, specifically the right to use a public
highway. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant
intentionally created the conditions complained
about, and that the condition was the proximate
cause of her injuries.
On January 31, 2007 the defendant Connecticut
Natural Gas filed a Motion to Strike the Third
Count of the plaintiffs complaint. The defendant
asserts that said count should be stricken for reason
that it is legally insufficient for reason that the
plaintiff failed to allege necessary facts to support
the legal conclusion that the defendant has
committed acts that constitute an absolute public
nuisance.

Standards
Facts
*1 The First Count of the plaintiffs amended
complaint alleges a violation of § 13a-149 C.G.S.,
the highway defect statute. She alleges that on or
about May 16, 2004 she was walking on a public
highway in front of 19 Thornhill Road in the Town
of Greenwich, Connecticut when he was caused to
trip and fall because of a dangerous and defective
condition. She specifically alleges that the highway
was uneven and unleveled and had a hole or crack
in its surface.
The Third Count of the compliant alleges an "
absolute public nuisance." The plaintiff alleges that
the defendant Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation

"A motion to strike challenges the legal
sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently,
requires no factual findings by the trial court. As a
result, our review of the court's ruling is plenary ...
We take the facts to be those alleged in the
complaint that has been stricken and we construe
the complaint in the manner most favorable to
sustaining its legal sufficiency ... Thus, [i]f facts
provable in the complaint would support a cause of
action, the motion to strike must be denied.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 260 Conn. 59,
64-65, 793 A.2d 1048 (2002). Thus, we assume the
truth of both the specific factual allegations and any
facts fairly provable thereunder. In doing so,
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(Cite as: Not Reported in A.2d)
moreover, we read the allegations broadly, rather
than narrowly "Macomber v. Travelers Property &
Casualty Corp., 261 Conn. 620, 629 (2002).
"A motion to strike is properly granted if the
complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are
unsupported by the facts alleged. "Cava//o v. Derby
Savings Bank 188 Conn. 281, 285, 449 A.2d 986
(1982); Mora v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 13
Conn.App. 208, 211, 535 A.2d 390 (1988).
Section 10-39 of the Practice Book concerns
the Motion to Strike. This section provides that: "
(a) Whenever any party wishes to contest (1) the
legal sufficiency of the allegations or any
complaint, counterclaim or cross claim, or any one
or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted ... that party may do so by
filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or
part thereof."
*2 The standard for considering motions to
strike has been well established in our courts: "[A]
motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a
pleading ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Eskin v. Castiglia, 253 Conn. 516, 522, 753 A.2d
927 (2000). In deciding on a motion to strike, the
court must "read the allegations of the complaint
generously to sustain its viability ..."Sherwood v.
Danbury Hospital, 252 Conn. 193, 212, 746 A.2d
730 (2000)."The court must construe the facts in the
complaint most favorably to the plaintiff. "(Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United
Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d
293 (1997)."If facts provable in the complaint
would support a cause of action, the motion to
strike must be denied."(Brackets omitted.) Lombard
v. Edward J. Peters, Jr ., P.C, 252 Conn. 623, 626,
749 A.2d 630 (2000)."In deciding on a motion to
strike ... the trial court must take the facts to be
those alleged in the [pleadings] ... and cannot be
aided by the assumption of any facts not therein
alleged."(Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Liljedahl Brothers, Inc. v. Grigsby,
215 Conn. 345, 348, 576 A.2d 149 (1990)."
Moreover [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an
allegation] need not be expressly alleged."Pamela
B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 308, 709 A.2d 1089
(1998).

Discussion
The plaintiff alleges in the third count of her
amended complaint that the defendant Connecticut
Natural Gas created an absolute public nuisance.
[T]o prevail on a claim of nuisance, a plaintiff
must prove that: '(1) the condition complained of
had a natural tendency to create danger and inflict
injury upon person or property; (2) the danger
created was a continuing one; (3) the use of the land
was unreasonable or unlawful; [and] (4) the
existence of the nuisance was a proximate cause of
the plaintiffs' injuries and damages.'(Internal
quotation
marks
omitted.)
State
v.
Tibbets-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton, 204 Conn. 177,
183, 527 A. (1987).4[W]here absolute public
nuisance is alleged, the plaintiffs burden includes
two other elements of proof: (1) that the condition
or conduct complained of interfered with a right
common to the general public; Higgins v.
Connecticut Light & Power Co., 129 Conn. 606,
611, 30 A.2d 388 (1943); Nolan v. New Britain, 69
Conn. 668, 678, 38 A. 703 (1897); 4 Restatement
(Second), Torts § 82IB; and (2) that the alleged
nuisance was absolute, that is, that the defendants'
intentional conduct, rather than their negligence,
caused the condition deemed to be a nuisance.
Kostyal v. Cass, [163 Conn. 92, 98, 302 A.2d 121
(1972) ]; Beckwith v. Stratford, 129 Conn. 506,
511, 29 A.2d 775 (1942); Dingwell v. Litchfield, 4
Conn.App. 621, 624, 496 A.2d 213 (1985); 1 F.
Harper & F. James, Torts (1956) p. 82 n. i: State v.
Tippits-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton,
supra,
204
Conn, at 183.
*3 Kelsey v. Connecticut Performing Arts,
Judicial District of New Haven, at New Haven,
D.N. CV 00 0441464S (Jan. 28, 2002, Zoarski,
JTR)
A defendant 'intentionally' creates a nuisance
when it intentionally creates a condition found to
constitute a nuisance, whether or not it intended or
understood that by creating that condition it was
doing wrong or creating a nuisance. Beckwith v.
Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 511, 29 A.2d 775 (1942)
(declaring that the word 'intentional,' when used to
describe an absolute public nuisance, means 'not
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that a wrong or the existence of a nuisance was
intended but that the creator of them intended to
bring about the conditions which are in fact found
to be a nuisance'). Thus, to establish that a
defendant intentionally created a public nuisance,
the plaintiff need only establish that it was the
defendant's conscious objective to create the
condition later claimed to constitute a public
nuisance essentially as it was when it caused the
plaintiff injury.

Conn.Super.,2007.
Bowen v. Town of Greenwich
Not Reported in A.2d, 2007
(Conn.Super.)
END OF DOCUMENT

Cunningham v. Ins. Co. of New York, Judicial
District of Hartford, at Hartford, D.N. CV 01
0806941 (Sep. 8, 2004, Sheldon, J.)
The plaintiffs complaint in its current form
states conclusory allegations concerning the
defendant's intention to create the conditions that
the plaintiff alleges are an absolute public nuisance.
For better or worse, we are a fact pleading state
and a motion to strike under Practice Book § 10-43
like the old common law demurrer, only admits '
well pleaded' facts; it does not admit opinions or
mere legal conclusions or conclusory statements. A
conclusory allegation cannot be used to avoid a
motion to strike. Elliot's Appeal, 74 Conn. 586, 601
(1902); McAdam v. Sheldon, 153 Conn. 278, 282
(1965); Moore v. Bunk, 154 Conn. 644, 649 (1967);
Connecticut Civil Procedure, Stephenson. Vol. 1, §
116(c); Connecticut Practice, Horton & Knox, Vol.
1, commentary at p. 275.This view necessarily
follows from the acceptance of a fact pleading
procedural regime because of the following
reasoning set forth in Smith v. Furness, 117 Conn.
97, 99 (1933) where the court said: 'The adverse
party has the right to have the facts appear so that
the question whether they support the conclusion
may be determined and that he (she) may have the
opportunity to deny them ... A pleading defective in
alleging a conclusion without facts to support it is
demurrable.'
Wayne Taylor et al. v. Mitchell College, 202
Ct.Sup. 14634 (2002).
For the foregoing reasons the motion to strike
the third count of the plaintiffs complaint is
granted. So Ordered.
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